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safetynet/docs/worker-ownership.md
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# Attributed agent background workers
The central `browser.allowAgentBackgroundWorkers` gate defaults false. The
permission-only `network:background` scope is also explicit in both the agent
baseline and individual grant; it is not a callable agent RPC. User profiles can
inherit or deny this feature (`features.agentBackgroundWorkers`); they cannot
allow it beyond baseline or grant. Applicable denials accumulate.
Development support is restricted to immutable, nonpersistent native browser
partitions owned by the enrolled device, individual principal and credential
generation. Human/default shared partitions, legacy callers and unattributed
worker traffic remain blocked. Enabling this feature is not general human browser
worker compatibility, persistence or cross-device worker roaming.
Before network release the owner registry must prove the worker's partition,
registration/source and native context; current policy, grant generation/expiry,
destination and DLP remain mandatory. The foreground tab or a renderer-provided
identity cannot establish ownership. Revocation must deny existing worker traffic,
not merely prevent new registrations. No cloud inspection or extra worker scope
bypasses local mandatory inspection.
## Verification status
The current real Electron admin workflow exercised typed login-rule editing,
independent signed publication and auditor read-only access. All 193 completed
API requests had exported traces; one canceled read had no failed mutation.
The collector reported zero rejected writes. Trace examples:
`a0f881d3c99650c53bacf547a191b216` and
`4416533c41ffe3e2adb81af46a30e0d4`.
Focused policy tests verify the disabled default, preservation through signed
publication, strict boolean validation and rejection of `network:background`
as an executable RPC. Eleven registry tests cover immutable ownership,
installation-before-network-use, revocation and retryable failed cleanup.
The central gate/scope controls start unchecked, and profile schema/enforcement
prove inherit/deny-only behavior. The actual Windows/Electron admin fixture also verifies the worker gate/scope
start off, auditor controls are disabled, and typed login-rule creation goes
through exact signed independent review and policy-history restoration. Its 193
completed API requests export parent-correlated spans; one canceled GET during
identity reload is recorded separately, with no failed mutation. See
`artifacts/agent-grants-history-admin-proof.json`,
`artifacts/agent-grants-history-admin-traces.json` and
`artifacts/credential-submission-admin-controls.png`.
Runtime owner-registry migration, actual native worker attribution/revocation
tests, runtime traces and final Windows/package proof are pending. Do not claim worker support solely from a stored policy flag.