26 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
26 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
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# Windows parser runtime ACL installation
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The inspector broker verifies every approved source, Python-runtime and local-model object with Windows `GetNamedSecurityInfoW`. Normal startup does not run `icacls`, change permissions, or require `WRITE_DAC`. It fails closed if the exact deployment AppContainer SID lacks read/execute permission, receives write permission, encounters conflicting deny ACEs, or finds a reparse point. Permission verification is conservative; administrators must resolve conflicting ACLs explicitly.
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After copying **all** installation files, the installer or deployment owner runs the installation's private Python:
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```powershell
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# Development installation, from the workspace root:
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.runtime/windows/python/python.exe apps/inspector/provision_runtime_acl.py --provision
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# Packaged installation, from the resources directory:
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python/python.exe inspector/provision_runtime_acl.py --provision
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```
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Omit `--provision` to verify without changing permissions. The command does not accept arbitrary grant paths. It derives the three approved roots from its own installed location and rejects an unrelated Python executable. It grants only read/execute to the deployment-specific package SID, never Everyone or ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES. It does not grant network capabilities or loopback exemptions.
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For a Program Files installation, provisioning requires an elevated installer or trusted service possessing permission to modify those installation DACLs. A standard user subsequently launches the broker without administrative rights; the broker can create its user AppContainer profile and read existing ACLs. An ordinary user cannot provision protected Program Files by running this command. The native tests currently prove read-only startup under the current Windows account and fail-closed missing permissions; they do **not** claim a separate standard-user Program Files deployment has been exercised on this machine.
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Provision again after replacing or adding runtime/source/model files or changing installation paths, because the SID is bound to the complete canonical root set. Run verification after provisioning and before service start. Updates must stop the broker during replacement. Production installation roots must be administrator-owned and unavailable for ordinary-user modification: read-only AppContainer grants do not prevent a deployment owner from modifying source or racing ACL provisioning. The command rejects existing reparse points but cannot protect an administrator-owned installation from a malicious administrator.
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Native verification:
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```powershell
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.runtime/windows/python/python.exe -m unittest discover -s apps/inspector -p test_windows_appcontainer.py
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```
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The tests provision synthetic/development roots explicitly, intercept any startup subprocess invocation, launch an actual AppContainer worker under verified ACLs, and reject an unprovisioned directory. Existing token, denied private-file access, denied runtime writes, denied networking, child containment, parser/YARA and deadline tests remain active.
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