Audit native transports and retain secure export diagnostics

docs/electron-security-review.md

@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
 
 This is a read-only review of the current source and unpacked Windows executable. It is not a penetration test or a claim of complete Chromium DLP coverage.
 
+Later entries record implementation and repeated native verification following
+this initial review. For current WebTransport per-attempt auditing and its
+coverage limits, use [native transport observability](native-transport-observability.md).
+Historical missing-event findings below have been superseded by that work;
+the separate native WebRTC engine crash remains an open acceptance gate.
+
 ## Official references
 
 Electron recommends isolated, sandboxed remote renderers, constrained IPC and navigation, current dependencies, and consideration of custom protocols and packaging fuses. [Security](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/security).
@@ -81,6 +87,15 @@ Inspection/inference runs outside the main process, but synchronous audit encryp
 
 ### Final package follow-up
 
+The subsequent shared clipboard/transport owner implementation also passed
+actual Windows package/runtime and fuse negative verifiers. Its enrolled native
+fixture now proves six Created and six Closed records, zero Established records,
+and twelve correlated lifecycle/audit traces. Clipboard/restart and actual local
+Gemma regressions passed with matching source hashes. This supersedes the
+transport audit-gap statements below for the specifically tested Window and
+dedicated Worker cases; it is not universal transport or payload coverage.
+See [native transport observation](native-transport-observability.md).
+
 The new frozen-source Windows build and both package verifiers passed after
 the startup correction. Actual baseline, RUN_AS_NODE, NODE_OPTIONS, CLI
 inspector, eleven certificate/feature override launches and copied-ASAR tampering