Add policy-bound credential submission and native DLP audit proofs

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Karl committed 2026-10-13 21:00:41 +02:00
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@@ -36,9 +36,11 @@ S Browser uses translucent materials, rounded controls, light/dark themes, and a
| Administration | Policy templates, diffs and history, independent publication review, groups, profiles, teaching workflows, incidents and configurable event retention. |
| AI and agents | Approved AI routing with server-held credentials; scoped local agent navigation, tabs, page interaction, settings, bookmarks, inspected history and bounded browser window controls. Separate centrally approved agent identities, scoped credentials, expiry, generation rotation and targeted revocation; administrators can disable all agent access. |
| Observability | OpenTelemetry traces, metrics and sanitized logs; durable security events; ECS/CEF exports and HTTPS/mTLS SIEM delivery. Governed protected download metadata, completed clipboard/agent-click metadata and opt-in observed foreground clicks/form gestures. Full replay and content recording remain incomplete. |
| Additional controls | Local encrypted password vault with explicit autofill and separately approved agent status/masked inventory/fill after human unlock; protected-brand visual similarity checks paired with trusted HTTPS origins. These features require further independent evaluation. |
| Additional controls | Local encrypted password vault with explicit autofill and separately approved agent status/masked inventory/fill after human unlock. Default-off controlled login preparation can authorize one approved native form POST; protected-brand visual similarity checks pair with trusted HTTPS origins. These features require further independent evaluation. |
Individual agent mode currently blocks browser-session requests without a known guarded tab owner, including unattributed background-worker traffic. Reliable agent ownership for these requests remains open. See [individual agent administration](docs/individual-agent-grants.md) and [agent API](AGENT-API.md). Separately approved [saved sessions](docs/agent-session-controls.md) retain locally encrypted URL/title/group collections; restoration rechecks current policy and creates managed tabs without saving form or authentication state.
Individual agent mode currently blocks browser-session requests without a known guarded tab owner, including unattributed background-worker traffic. Reliable agent ownership for these requests remains open. The browser does not assign an unattributed request to whichever tab happens to be foreground. See [individual agent administration](docs/individual-agent-grants.md) and [agent API](AGENT-API.md). Separately approved [saved sessions](docs/agent-session-controls.md) retain locally encrypted URL/title/group collections; restoration rechecks current policy and creates managed tabs without saving form or authentication state.
[Controlled vault login preparation](docs/controlled-credential-policy.md) is separate from ordinary autofill. Administrators approve exact HTTPS action URLs and credential field names; human unlock is required, and agents need the separate `vault:prepare-submit` capability. Preparation fills the form but does not submit it. Supported native same-origin URL-encoded POSTs remain subject to current policy and inspection of every other field; arbitrary JavaScript/XHR/JSON login flows remain unsupported. The approved site can read filled credentials in its DOM. This is not password isolation or proof of website identity.
Permissions are enforced by the backend and privileged browser code, not merely by hiding controls. Matching restrictive policies accumulate. Domain categories are curated company lists, not a subscription categorization feed.