Add policy-bound credential submission and native DLP audit proofs
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@@ -36,9 +36,11 @@ S Browser uses translucent materials, rounded controls, light/dark themes, and a
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| Administration | Policy templates, diffs and history, independent publication review, groups, profiles, teaching workflows, incidents and configurable event retention. |
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| AI and agents | Approved AI routing with server-held credentials; scoped local agent navigation, tabs, page interaction, settings, bookmarks, inspected history and bounded browser window controls. Separate centrally approved agent identities, scoped credentials, expiry, generation rotation and targeted revocation; administrators can disable all agent access. |
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| Observability | OpenTelemetry traces, metrics and sanitized logs; durable security events; ECS/CEF exports and HTTPS/mTLS SIEM delivery. Governed protected download metadata, completed clipboard/agent-click metadata and opt-in observed foreground clicks/form gestures. Full replay and content recording remain incomplete. |
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| Additional controls | Local encrypted password vault with explicit autofill and separately approved agent status/masked inventory/fill after human unlock; protected-brand visual similarity checks paired with trusted HTTPS origins. These features require further independent evaluation. |
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| Additional controls | Local encrypted password vault with explicit autofill and separately approved agent status/masked inventory/fill after human unlock. Default-off controlled login preparation can authorize one approved native form POST; protected-brand visual similarity checks pair with trusted HTTPS origins. These features require further independent evaluation. |
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Individual agent mode currently blocks browser-session requests without a known guarded tab owner, including unattributed background-worker traffic. Reliable agent ownership for these requests remains open. See [individual agent administration](docs/individual-agent-grants.md) and [agent API](AGENT-API.md). Separately approved [saved sessions](docs/agent-session-controls.md) retain locally encrypted URL/title/group collections; restoration rechecks current policy and creates managed tabs without saving form or authentication state.
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Individual agent mode currently blocks browser-session requests without a known guarded tab owner, including unattributed background-worker traffic. Reliable agent ownership for these requests remains open. The browser does not assign an unattributed request to whichever tab happens to be foreground. See [individual agent administration](docs/individual-agent-grants.md) and [agent API](AGENT-API.md). Separately approved [saved sessions](docs/agent-session-controls.md) retain locally encrypted URL/title/group collections; restoration rechecks current policy and creates managed tabs without saving form or authentication state.
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[Controlled vault login preparation](docs/controlled-credential-policy.md) is separate from ordinary autofill. Administrators approve exact HTTPS action URLs and credential field names; human unlock is required, and agents need the separate `vault:prepare-submit` capability. Preparation fills the form but does not submit it. Supported native same-origin URL-encoded POSTs remain subject to current policy and inspection of every other field; arbitrary JavaScript/XHR/JSON login flows remain unsupported. The approved site can read filled credentials in its DOM. This is not password isolation or proof of website identity.
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Permissions are enforced by the backend and privileged browser code, not merely by hiding controls. Matching restrictive policies accumulate. Domain categories are curated company lists, not a subscription categorization feed.
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