Implement managed browser security, individual agents and observability
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# Office macro download inspection
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With central YARA enabled, `security.yara.scanOfficeMacros` defaults to true.
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The contained local scanner matches the same administrator rules against original
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bytes, unpacked VBA projects, contiguous OLE streams (including compiled data),
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and decompressed VBA source. It does not execute macros or retain source code.
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Admins can turn this additional extraction off independently of YARA. ICAP remains
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mandatory when enabled; all enabled scanners must approve the exact downloaded
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bytes before the browser offers to save them. A matching rule blocks the file.
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Benign VBA is not blocked simply because a macro exists. Archive, stream, module,
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code and runtime budgets bound parsing; failures do not become clean results.
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The default incoming document-DLP requirement remains conservative. Office rendered
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content is not completely classified. To allow incoming Office after malware
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inspection, an admin can explicitly disable `fileTransfers.download.requireDocumentDlp`
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in Download inspection and publish the policy. This affects incoming document DLP;
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upload checks remain enforced. At least one malware scanner is still required.
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Explicit no-antivirus mode continues to require complete document DLP.
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Supported local extraction targets ordinary VBA projects in OOXML and OLE. XLM,
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XLSB, encrypted/corrupt projects and embedded Office containers remain unsupported
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and block when extraction is enabled. Source matching cannot establish source/p-code
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equivalence or detect every obfuscated macro; ICAP/AV remains a complementary layer.
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A pinned benign XlsxWriter fixture verifies that a source-only YARA marker absent
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from original ZIP bytes blocks after extraction, while an unmatched benign project
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allows the malware gate. The same two outcomes are tested inside Windows AppContainer.
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Dependencies are four curated hash-pinned wheels in requirements-macros.lock.txt;
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optional p-code/XLM tools are not installed or invoked.
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Extraction follows [olevba's source extraction API](https://github.com/decalage2/oletools/blob/master/oletools/doc/olevba.md)
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and bounded [MS-OVBA compression](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ec1bc788-27de-47d9-8db4-6be2b5cff52b).
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