Implement managed browser security, individual agents and observability
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# Protected incident evidence
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The incident console lists linked evidence metadata without decrypting content.
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Administrators and the dedicated analyst role can choose incident-response,
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investigation or compliance as an access purpose and explicitly reveal a record.
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`OIDC_ANALYST_GROUP` grants evidence read and incident triage without policy, device,
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SIEM or session administration. It remains a server-defined role, not a permission
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supplied by the browser. Operator membership takes precedence over analyst when
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both are configured; administrators retain full access.
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Plaintext uses textContent, never HTML, and is cleared after one minute, selection
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changes, refresh, permission/identity changes, logout and page hiding. Delayed
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responses cannot restore older content. Reveals are restricted to the available
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records shown for the selected incident and checked against source-event identity.
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Every successful plaintext response follows a durable purpose-bound access audit.
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Evidence is device-reported information, not an independent truth attestation.
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Incoming action, decision, host, file digest/size and supplied content digest are
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compared with available source facts. Legacy events without those facts cannot
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supply the same verification. Encryption authenticates the evidence row; a fully
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tamper-evident source audit chain remains a separate production requirement.
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Configure the external 32-byte `EVIDENCE_KEY_FILE` before enabling storage. On
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Windows, startup verifies owner and read/write ACLs and rejects shared key access;
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protect the file to the service identity, SYSTEM and Administrators. POSIX requires
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an owner-only file. No key is exposed through the console. Key rotation, external
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KMS/HSM custody and production backup/recovery remain deployment work.
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Tests exercise actual encrypted storage, RBAC, audit failure, mismatched facts,
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expiry/active incident hold and integrity failure. The genuine Electron console
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proof covers purpose-bound reveal, literal script text and clearing, while backend
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OpenTelemetry exports normalized metadata/discovery/reveal route timings.
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Automatic native browser capture and centrally signed collection rules remain
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open. This viewer completes the existing protected storage/API-to-analyst path;
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it does not yet collect every click or confidential clipboard fragment itself.
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