# First-class agents and forensic observability User clarification, 2026-10-13: agents must operate the application as first-class clients, including tabs, permitted settings and bookmarks. Central administrators can disable access and limit individual capabilities. Mandatory corporate policy applies equally to a human and an agent. Generic JavaScript/CDP, cookie extraction and overriding a centrally locked setting are not alternate control paths. Agent authentication must support cryptographic client identity, narrowly scoped revocable credentials, bounded requests, replay protection and attributable audit. The local transport now uses DPAPI pairing, HMAC proof of possession, replay protection and pinned signed post-quantum encrypted requests/replies. Delegated per-agent identities and individual revocation remain required work. Full UI automation, history/library, safe screenshots and broader application capabilities remain separately tracked from the implemented controls. Security analysts need enough detail to reconstruct what happened: navigation, download name/source/hash/scan outcome, click target, copy/cut/paste direction, initiating tab/agent and the relevant rule and result. Confidentiality alone must not suppress security-relevant evidence. Passwords and authentication tokens must never enter logs. URLs, element labels and content may themselves contain secrets; they need typed redaction and centrally governed evidence collection. The security audit and confidential evidence store are distinct from operational OpenTelemetry. The evidence store must encrypt records, bind them to immutable event identities, restrict analyst access, log every access, enforce retention and support incident correlation and SIEM references. Selected relevant content may be retained by policy; storing entire documents is not required. Existing metadata events do not satisfy this full forensic requirement. Detailed download records, human click tracking and controlled content evidence are still to implement. OpenTelemetry debug mode must expose correlated spans for IPC, agents, navigation, network/DNS, document/OCR/YARA/semantic inspection, policy handling and management requests, including durations and named code stages. Debug collection is centrally managed, bounded and disableable. Operational spans do not silently become a raw content or credential archive. Backend tracing and collector/SIEM permissions, encryption and retention must complete the end-to-end pipeline.