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karldns.de/karldns/security.py
T

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8.0 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import secrets
import time
from datetime import UTC, datetime
from ipaddress import ip_address, ip_network
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from .settings import DdnsSettings
DASHBOARD_UNLOCK_COOKIE = "ddns_dashboard_unlock"
DASHBOARD_UNLOCK_DEFAULT_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60
DASHBOARD_UNLOCK_STAY_SIGNED_IN_SECONDS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60
PRIVATE_PROXY_NETWORKS = tuple(
ip_network(network)
for network in (
"10.0.0.0/8",
"172.16.0.0/12",
"192.168.0.0/16",
"127.0.0.0/8",
"169.254.0.0/16",
"::1/128",
"fc00::/7",
"fe80::/10",
)
)
def credentials_from_basic_auth(header: str) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
try:
raw = base64.b64decode(header.split(" ", 1)[1]).decode("utf-8")
except Exception:
return None, None
if ":" not in raw:
return None, None
username, password = raw.split(":", 1)
return username, password
def hash_secret(token: str) -> str:
salt = secrets.token_hex(16)
digest = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac("sha256", token.encode("utf-8"), salt.encode("ascii"), 200_000)
return f"pbkdf2_sha256${salt}${digest.hex()}"
def verify_secret(token: str, stored: str) -> bool:
try:
algorithm, salt, expected = stored.split("$", 2)
except ValueError:
return False
if algorithm != "pbkdf2_sha256":
return False
digest = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac("sha256", token.encode("utf-8"), salt.encode("ascii"), 200_000)
return hmac.compare_digest(digest.hex(), expected)
def hash_lookup_token(token: str) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
def sign_dashboard_unlock_cookie(
hostname: str,
management_slug: str,
password_hash: str,
signing_secret: str,
max_age_seconds: int,
now: int | None = None,
) -> str:
timestamp = int(time.time() if now is None else now)
bounded_max_age = _bounded_dashboard_unlock_seconds(max_age_seconds)
signature = _dashboard_unlock_signature(
hostname,
management_slug,
password_hash,
signing_secret,
timestamp,
bounded_max_age,
)
return f"v3:{timestamp}:{bounded_max_age}:{signature}"
def verify_dashboard_unlock_cookie(
hostname: str,
management_slug: str,
password_hash: str | None,
signing_secret: str,
cookie_value: str | None,
) -> bool:
if not password_hash or not signing_secret or not cookie_value:
return False
try:
version, raw_timestamp, raw_max_age, supplied = cookie_value.split(":", 3)
timestamp = int(raw_timestamp)
max_age_seconds = _bounded_dashboard_unlock_seconds(int(raw_max_age))
except ValueError:
return False
if version != "v3":
return False
now = int(time.time())
if timestamp > now + 60 or now - timestamp > max_age_seconds:
return False
expected = _dashboard_unlock_signature(
hostname,
management_slug,
password_hash,
signing_secret,
timestamp,
max_age_seconds,
)
return hmac.compare_digest(supplied, expected)
def _dashboard_unlock_signature(
hostname: str,
management_slug: str,
password_hash: str,
signing_secret: str,
timestamp: int,
max_age_seconds: int,
) -> str:
payload = f"{hostname}\0{management_slug}\0{password_hash}\0{timestamp}\0{max_age_seconds}".encode()
return hmac.new(signing_secret.encode(), payload, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def dashboard_cookie_signing_secret(settings: DdnsSettings) -> str:
return settings.dashboard_cookie_secret or settings.admin_password
def dashboard_csrf_token(management_slug: str, account: dict[str, str | int | None]) -> str:
hostname = str(account["hostname"])
password_hash = str(account.get("dashboard_password_hash") or "")
day = datetime.now(UTC).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
key = f"{management_slug}\0{password_hash}".encode()
return hmac.new(key, f"dashboard:{hostname}:{day}".encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def require_dashboard_csrf(management_slug: str, account: dict[str, str | int | None], supplied: str) -> None:
if not supplied or not hmac.compare_digest(supplied, dashboard_csrf_token(management_slug, account)):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="invalid csrf token")
def _bounded_dashboard_unlock_seconds(max_age_seconds: int) -> int:
return max(60, min(max_age_seconds, DASHBOARD_UNLOCK_STAY_SIGNED_IN_SECONDS))
def admin_csrf_token(settings: DdnsSettings) -> str:
day = datetime.now(UTC).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
return hmac.new(settings.admin_password.encode("utf-8"), f"admin:{day}".encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def require_admin_csrf(settings: DdnsSettings, supplied: str) -> None:
if not supplied or not hmac.compare_digest(supplied, admin_csrf_token(settings)):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="invalid csrf token")
def client_ip(request: Request, settings: DdnsSettings | None = None) -> str:
peer = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
if _should_trust_proxy_headers(peer, settings):
forwarded_ip = _client_ip_from_headers(request)
if forwarded_ip:
return forwarded_ip
return peer
def is_rate_limited_path(path: str) -> bool:
return path == "/" or path.startswith(("/m/", "/api/v1/hostnames", "/api/v1/router/"))
def rate_limit_bucket(path: str) -> str:
for prefix in ("/m/", "/api/v1/hostnames", "/api/v1/router/"):
if path.startswith(prefix):
return prefix.rstrip("/")
return path
def _trusted_proxy(peer: str, trusted: set[str]) -> bool:
if not trusted:
return False
try:
peer_ip = ip_address(peer)
except ValueError:
return False
for candidate in trusted:
try:
if "/" in candidate and peer_ip in ip_network(candidate, strict=False):
return True
if "/" not in candidate and peer_ip == ip_address(candidate):
return True
except ValueError:
continue
return False
def _should_trust_proxy_headers(peer: str, settings: DdnsSettings | None) -> bool:
if settings and _trusted_proxy(peer, settings.trusted_proxy_ips):
return True
if settings and settings.trust_private_proxy_headers:
return _private_proxy_peer(peer)
return False
def _private_proxy_peer(peer: str) -> bool:
try:
peer_ip = ip_address(peer)
except ValueError:
return False
return any(peer_ip in network for network in PRIVATE_PROXY_NETWORKS)
def _client_ip_from_headers(request: Request) -> str | None:
for header_name in ("cf-connecting-ip", "true-client-ip", "x-real-ip"):
candidate = _valid_header_ip(request.headers.get(header_name, ""))
if candidate:
return candidate
for candidate in request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "").split(","):
parsed = _valid_header_ip(candidate)
if parsed:
return parsed
return _client_ip_from_forwarded(request.headers.get("forwarded", ""))
def _client_ip_from_forwarded(value: str) -> str | None:
for forwarded_pair in value.split(";"):
key, separator, candidate = forwarded_pair.strip().partition("=")
if separator and key.lower() == "for":
parsed = _valid_header_ip(candidate)
if parsed:
return parsed
return None
def _valid_header_ip(value: str) -> str | None:
cleaned = _strip_header_ip(value)
if not cleaned:
return None
try:
return str(ip_address(cleaned))
except ValueError:
return None
def _strip_header_ip(value: str) -> str:
cleaned = value.strip().strip('"').strip("'")
if not cleaned or cleaned.lower() == "unknown":
return ""
if cleaned.startswith("[") and "]" in cleaned:
return cleaned[1 : cleaned.index("]")]
if cleaned.count(":") == 1:
host, port = cleaned.rsplit(":", 1)
if port.isdigit():
return host
return cleaned