33 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
33 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# Immutable native upload binding: Electron 44.7 feasibility
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This proof is **not a production upload implementation**. Existing managed browser file/data-pipe upload rejection must remain in place.
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Run `node scripts/immutable-upload-probe.cjs`. It launches a finite, hidden, CPU-rendered, sandboxed Electron fixture against a loopback HTTP receiver. No managed browser configuration, actual credentials, OS clipboard, or website code is changed. The fixture uses a real HTML file input populated through test-only native CDP, then submits Chromium-generated multipart FormData.
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## Evidence
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`artifacts/immutable-upload-probe.json` records:
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- `requestBodyAvailable: true`: `session.protocol.handle('http')` exposes the real multipart file stream through `Request.arrayBuffer()`.
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- `mutatedAfterSnapshot: true`: the disk fixture is replaced after body capture and before forwarding.
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- `exactBytes: true`: receiver SHA-256 equals inspected snapshot SHA-256; receiver contains the original bytes and excludes the replacement bytes.
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- `credentialsPreserved: false`: both renderer `credentials: 'include'` and `credentials: 'omit'` become protocol requests reporting `credentials: 'same-origin'`, with no Cookie header. Forwarding through the same session attaches its synthetic session cookie to both. The original credential choice cannot be inferred from these fields.
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- `redirectDenied: true`: forwarding with `redirect: 'error'` denies a 307 and never reaches the redirect destination. Transparent redirect compatibility is therefore not established.
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The cookie behavior is a security blocker for a transparent HTTP(S) protocol bridge. The proof deliberately asserts this limitation rather than presenting a passing byte comparison as sufficient approval to ship.
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## Compatibility and security boundaries
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Electron documents that protocol requests include a trusted `initiatorOrigin`. This establishes the requesting origin; it does not recover the original Fetch credential mode, top-level site cookie context, authenticated request semantics, redirect chain, or full request policy context.
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CORS preservation has **not been demonstrated**. Browser preflight handling, credential-dependent `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` rules, opaque responses, response URL/type, frame/site cookie partitioning, authentication challenges, and service-worker paths require separate receiver-based tests and implementation support. They must not be inferred from same-origin multipart success. Electron explicitly documents incorrect response `.type` and `.url` for `session.fetch`, and says bypassing custom protocols still invokes `webRequest` handlers. Consequently an integration also needs safe request identity and recursion handling; a broad trusted forwarding bypass would weaken existing enforcement.
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The anonymous-only fallback was not implemented. A deployable solution must preserve original Chromium request semantics and bind the scanner decision to immutable bytes, destination, policy version, identity, and request context. Native Chromium interception or a verified native network integration remains required before file/data-pipe upload support can be enabled.
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## Primary references
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- [Electron protocol.handle documentation](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/api/protocol#protocolhandlescheme-handler): protocol request body and trusted initiator origin.
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- [Electron session.fetch documentation](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/api/session#sesfetchinput-init): Chromium network stack, response limitations, custom-protocol bypass and continuing webRequest callbacks.
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This test concerns one in-memory multipart upload. It does not prove full DLP coverage for streaming, WebSockets, WebRTC, browser uploads, or downloads.
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