48 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
48 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Attributed agent background workers
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The central `browser.allowAgentBackgroundWorkers` gate defaults false. The
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permission-only `network:background` scope is also explicit in both the agent
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baseline and individual grant; it is not a callable agent RPC. User profiles can
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inherit or deny this feature (`features.agentBackgroundWorkers`); they cannot
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allow it beyond baseline or grant. Applicable denials accumulate.
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Development support is restricted to immutable, nonpersistent native browser
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partitions owned by the enrolled device, individual principal and credential
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generation. Human/default shared partitions, legacy callers and unattributed
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worker traffic remain blocked. Enabling this feature is not general human browser
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worker compatibility, persistence or cross-device worker roaming.
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Before network release the owner registry must prove the worker's partition,
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registration/source and native context; current policy, grant generation/expiry,
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destination and DLP remain mandatory. The foreground tab or a renderer-provided
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identity cannot establish ownership. Revocation must deny existing worker traffic,
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not merely prevent new registrations. No cloud inspection or extra worker scope
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bypasses local mandatory inspection.
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## Verification status
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The current real Electron admin workflow exercised typed login-rule editing,
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independent signed publication and auditor read-only access. All 193 completed
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API requests had exported traces; one canceled read had no failed mutation.
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The collector reported zero rejected writes. Trace examples:
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`a0f881d3c99650c53bacf547a191b216` and
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`4416533c41ffe3e2adb81af46a30e0d4`.
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Focused policy tests verify the disabled default, preservation through signed
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publication, strict boolean validation and rejection of `network:background`
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as an executable RPC. Eleven registry tests cover immutable ownership,
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installation-before-network-use, revocation and retryable failed cleanup.
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The central gate/scope controls start unchecked, and profile schema/enforcement
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prove inherit/deny-only behavior. The actual Windows/Electron admin fixture also verifies the worker gate/scope
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start off, auditor controls are disabled, and typed login-rule creation goes
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through exact signed independent review and policy-history restoration. Its 193
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completed API requests export parent-correlated spans; one canceled GET during
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identity reload is recorded separately, with no failed mutation. See
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`artifacts/agent-grants-history-admin-proof.json`,
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`artifacts/agent-grants-history-admin-traces.json` and
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`artifacts/credential-submission-admin-controls.png`.
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Runtime owner-registry migration, actual native worker attribution/revocation
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tests, runtime traces and final Windows/package proof are pending. Do not claim worker support solely from a stored policy flag.
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